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SIGNING STATEMENTS AND THE PRESIDENT’S AUTHORITY TO REFUSE TO ENFORCE THE LAW 
 
Neil Kinkopf* 
 
Signing statements have been very much in the news lately.  But this publicity has been as 
likely to engender confusion as understanding.  In part this is because “signing statement” is 
used as a short-hand reference for two distinct issues:  one issue has to do with whether and 
when the President may refuse to enforce a law that the President regards as unconstitutional; 
the other issue is whether the courts should take into account the views of the President when 
reviewing the legislative history of a statute.  I propose to focus on the former issue because 
the current Bush Administration has so vigorously and frequently asserted the authority to 
refuse that the issue has taken on an immediate importance.  For anyone interested in a full, 
scholarly treatment of the subject, I recommend Professor Dawn Johnsen’s outstanding 
article on the subject (“Presidential Non-Enforcement of Constitutionally Objectionable 
Statutes,” 63 L.& CONTEMP. PROBS. 7 (WINTER/SPRING 2000)), which has informed and 
influenced the discussion that follows. 
 
Historically, signing statements have served a largely innocuous and ceremonial function. 
 They are issued by the President to explain his reasons for signing a bill into law.  A signing 
statement thus serves to promote public awareness and discourse in much the same way as a 
veto message.  Controversy arises when a signing statement is used not to extol the virtues of 
the bill being signed into law, but to simultaneously condemn a provision of the new law as 
unconstitutional and announce the President’s refusal to enforce the unconstitutional 
provision.  This refusal to enforce laws represents a controversial exercise of presidential 
power, but it is crucial to keep this controversy distinct from the vehicle by which that power 
is announced – the signing statement.  There is nothing inherently wrong with or 
controversial about signing statements.  Most do not contain an assertion of presidential 
power.  For those that do, the signing statement itself ironically serves the laudable function 
of promoting accountability.  Even if one rejects the idea that the President may refuse to 
enforce a law, at least the President is openly declaring what he plans to do.  Put differently, 
if the President is to sign a bill into law with his fingers crossed, better that they be crossed 
where we can see them than that they be crossed behind his back.  The controversy, then, is 
not over the use of signing statements but over the assertion of a non-enforcement power that 
is sometimes declared in signing statements.   
 
The controversy over whether the President has the authority to refuse to enforce laws he 
views as unconstitutional has been sharpened during the current administration by the 
frequency with which it has asserted this authority.  In a recent and important study, political 
science Professor Philip Cooper has analyzed the exercise of this non-enforcement power by 
the Bush Administration.  (“George W. Bush, Edgar Allan Poe, and the Use and Abuse of 
Presidential Signing Statements,” 35 PRES. STUD. Q. 515 (2005).)  He found that President 
Bush has deployed the non-enforcement power with unprecedented breadth and frequency – 
                                                 
*
 Associate Professor, Georgia State University College of Law 
 3 
over 500 times during the first term alone.  The figures from the study were updated in an 
excellent article by Boston Globe reporter Charlie Savage, which puts the number at over 
750, which is more than all of President Bush’s predecessor’s combined.  “Bush Challenges 
Hundreds of Laws,” BOSTON GLOBE, April 30, 2006, at A1.  As a result, a front page 
article in USA Today cataloging the ways in which the Bush Administration has sought to 
expand presidential power listed presidential non-enforcement (using the label “signing 
statements”) first.  Susan Page, “Congress, Courts Push Back Against Bush's Assertions of 
Presidential Power,” USA TODAY, June 6, 2006, at 1. 
 
THE CONTROVERSY 
 
The assertion of a presidential power to refuse to enforce a law stands in deep tension 
with the Constitution.  As the Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized, the Take Care 
Clause – which provides that the President “shall take care that the Laws be faithfully 
executed” – establishes that the President does not hold the royal prerogative of a dispensing 
power, which is the power to dispense with or suspend the execution of the laws.  The Take 
Care Clause, then, makes plain that the President is duty-bound to enforce all the laws, 
whether he agrees with them or not.   
 
A presidential power to refuse to enforce the laws is also inconsistent with the 
constitutional process for the enactment of legislation.  As the old Saturday morning cartoon 
literally illustrates, the Constitution provides that a bill cannot become a law unless the 
President gives his assent.  This assent must be given or withheld in whole, as the Supreme 
Court recently emphasized in striking down a statutory line-item veto. Clinton v. New York, 
524 U.S. 417 (1998).  In The Federalist, James Madison describes the system of checks-and-
balances.  The President’s principle weapon against legislative encroachments and against 
improvident legislation is his veto power.   Under the Constitution’s design, then, if the 
President regards a provision of a bill to be unconstitutional, the appropriate remedy is a veto. 
 
The case against a presidential power of non-enforcement seems quite powerful.  Yet 
Presidents of both parties have over the course of many years refused to enforce 
unconstitutional laws, including laws they themselves have signed into existence.  How can 
this be?  The explanation has both pragmatic and formal elements.  As a practical matter, 
some legislation cannot be vetoed.  Especially as Congress turns more and more to the use of 
omnibus legislation which encompasses many indispensable provisions – funding for the 
military, for example – it becomes practically impossible for even the most scrupulous 
President to veto a bill simply because one minor and obscure provision is unconstitutional.  
As a formal matter, Presidents do not typically assert the power to refuse to enforce a law.  
Rather, Presidents note that because the Constitution is also a law, they must enforce the 
Constitution by refusing to enforce an unconstitutional law.  To take an uncontroversial 
example, the Supreme Court ruled all legislative vetoes unconstitutional in INS v. Chadha, 
462 U.S. 919 (1983).  After the Chadha decision, no one has criticized the Presidents (of 
both parties) who have refused to enforce the thousands of legislative vetoes that remain on 
the books.  Moreover, as Louis Fisher has pointed out, Congress has enacted hundreds of 
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legislative vetoes since Chadha, and not even members of Congress expect the President to 
veto such legislation or to enforce the patently unconstitutional legislative veto provisions.  
The President complies with, rather than violates, his Take Care Clause duty by adhering to 
the Constitution’s requirements and by refusing to apply the incompatible and 
unconstitutional law.  The principled and fairly consistent (between the political parties) 
position of the executive branch boils down to this:  where a statute is unconstitutional, it is 
the President’s duty to refuse to enforce the unconstitutional statute.   
 
The executive branch’s position raises a difficult question:  when is a statute 
unconstitutional?  It is surely the case that when a statute is definitively determined to be 
unconstitutional, such a statute should not be enforced.  But there are many occasions where 
a law’s constitutionality is indeterminate.  For example, a statute may raise a question that 
has not been squarely addressed by the courts.  Or, if squarely addressed, the President may 
nevertheless believe that he can convince the court in a subsequent case to draw a distinction 
or overrule its precedent – as President Franklin Roosevelt did with respect to his New Deal 
legislation.  What is the President to do when he regards a law to be unconstitutional, but for 
one reason or another, there is no definitive resolution to the question?  This is the most 
difficult aspect of the controversy. 
 
RESOLVING THE CONSTITUTIONAL TENSIONS  
 
Some commentators take an absolutist position:  until a statute’s unconstitutionality is 
definitively established, the President must enforce the statute.  The absolutist position is 
contrary to longstanding and consistent executive branch practice dating at least to 1860.  
Moreover, the absolutist position fails to account for the complexities of how constitutional 
meaning is established.  For example, the President’s determination that he will enforce a law 
that he regards as unconstitutional will sometimes deprive the judiciary of the opportunity to 
rule on the question.  Imagine, for example, that Congress enacts a statute (overriding the 
President’s veto) that forbids the Justice Department to pursue any investigation or 
prosecution of Tom Delay or William Jefferson.  The President would almost certainly regard 
this statute as an unconstitutional encroachment on the prosecutorial discretion of the 
executive branch, but there is not sufficient precedent on the subject to predict with 
confidence what the Supreme Court would ultimately say.  If the President were to order the 
Justice Department to comply with the statute and cease prosecution, there would be no 
occasion for the judiciary to rule on the constitutional question of whether the statute violates 
the constitutional powers of the executive.  Similarly, had President Woodrow Wilson 
enforced the provisions of the Tenure in Office Act, there would have been no apparent basis 
for the lawsuit, Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926), in which the Supreme Court 
ultimately declared the Act unconstitutional.  Thus, the absolutist position can actually lead to 
a situation in which unconstitutional laws are enforced with no meaningful opportunity for 
judicial review. 
 
If absolute enforcement is unacceptable, we must determine when it is appropriate for a 
President to decline to enforce a statute because the president regards the statue as 
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unconstitutional.  Walter Dellinger, writing as the head of the Justice Department’s Office of 
Legal Counsel, set forth the classic treatment of this question in a memorandum for then-
White House Counsel Abner Mikva, “Presidential Authority to Decline to Execute 
Unconstitutional Statutes,” 18 OP. O.L.C. (1994).  Dellinger concluded that “[a]s a general 
matter, if the President believes that the Court would sustain a particular provision as 
constitutional, the president should execute the statute, notwithstanding his own beliefs about 
the constitutional issue.  If, however, the President, exercising his independent judgment, 
determines both that a provision would violate the Constitution and that it is probable that the 
Court would agree with him, the President has the authority to decline to execute the statute.”  
 
But Dellinger emphasized that this authority does not represent an unbounded discretion. 
 Rather, in determining how to act, the President must pursue the course of action that takes 
account of and advances all the relevant aspects of constitutional structure.  The decision will 
inevitably be dependent on the context of the specific case.  In deciding whether to enforce a 
statute, the President should be guided by:  “a careful weighing of the effect of compliance 
with the provision on the constitutional rights of affected individuals and on the executive 
branch’s constitutional authority.  Also relevant is the likelihood that compliance or non-
compliance will permit judicial resolution of the issue.”  The decision is to be guided by 
close consideration of the effect of enforcement on individual rights, the constitutional 
balance of power between the branches, and the Supreme Court’s “special role in resolving 
disputes about the constitutionality of enactments.” 
 
So formulated, the President does not enjoy a power to decline to enforce a law whenever 
he sees fit, or whenever he can articulate a constitutional objection (which practically may 
amount to the same thing).  Take the application of the Dellinger principles in the Clinton 
Administration.  In 1996, Congress passed as part of the annual military appropriation bill a 
provision requiring the discharge from military service of anyone with human 
immunodeficiency virus (HIV).  The President believed that the HIV provision was 
unconstitutional but signed the bill into law because he could not deprive the military of the 
money it needed to operate (this coming on the heels of two government shutdowns).  
President Clinton decided to follow a two-pronged strategy.  He would seek the repeal of the 
HIV provision and, failing repeal, he would enforce the provision in order to secure a judicial 
resolution of the controversy.  Threatened with the prospect of judicial rebuke, Congress 
repealed the HIV provision.   
 
DISREGARD FOR THE CONSTITUTION 
 
The Bush Administration’s approach is in stark contrast with the Clinton 
Administration’s.  Far from a careful, contextual weighing of disparate constitutional factors 
framed by a respect for the special role of the Supreme Court in resolving constitutional 
issues, the Bush Administration has operated with a careless disregard for constitutional 
structure and has asserted its own raw power with contempt for the role of the Supreme 
Court.  This is dramatically illustrated by the frequency with which the Bush Administration 
has articulated its intention not to enforce laws.  The Bush Administration has not fought for 
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the repeal of the more than 700 provisions it has identified as unconstitutional, much less has 
it carefully weighed the facts and circumstances of each of those instances.  Indeed, a review 
of these objections shows that they are treated in a mechanical fashion, with boilerplate 
objections phrased over and over again in signing statements.   
 
The contempt of the Bush Administration for constitutional limits on its own power is 
nowhere more evident than in the statement accompanying the signing of the McCain 
Amendment.  The McCain Amendment forbids United States personnel from engaging in 
cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment of detainees, adding these prohibitions to the 
existing prohibition on the use of torture.  Upon signing the McCain amendment into law, 
President Bush issued a statement declaring that the executive branch would interpret the 
McCain Amendment “in a manner consistent with the constitutional authority of the 
president to supervise the unitary executive branch and as Commander in Chief and 
consistent with the constitutional limitations on the judicial power ….”  The President cannot 
have concluded that his view would likely be vindicated by the Court.  The “unitary 
executive” view of presidential power is an extreme construction that lacks judicial sanction. 
Moreover, it is precisely this view that supported the Administration’s infamous torture 
memo, which the Bush Administration itself pointedly refused to defend, and ultimately 
repudiated, after it became public.   
 
It is even more remarkable that the language of the McCain Amendment signing 
statement is itself boilerplate.  This “power to supervise the unitary executive” objection was 
raised, essentially verbatim, against 82 separate provisions of law during the first term of the 
Bush Administration alone, according to Professor Philip Cooper’s study.  This simply 
cannot be the result of a careful balancing of constitutional considerations.  Moreover, the 
clinching phrase about the constitutional limitations of the judicial power speaks volumes 
about the Administration’s contempt for the judiciary’s role in constraining executive power, 
coming as it did on the heels of the Supreme Court’s declaration in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 
S. Ct. 2633 (2004) at 536, that “a state of war is not a blank check for the President ….”   
 
These problems are not limited (if 82-and-counting occurrences can be called limited) to 
the President’s construction of his own power as unitary executive.  President Bush’s arsenal 
includes boilerplate language for objecting to laws that he recommend legislation to 
Congress, that he disclose information to Congress or the public, that set qualifications for 
federal officeholders, or that so much as mention race.  For example, the President signed 
into law a bill establishing an Institute of Education Sciences.  The signing statement 
pertaining to this law raised a constitutional objection in what seems like a laudable and 
unobjectionable goal for the new institute:  “closing the achievement gap between high-
performing and low-performing children, especially achievement gaps between minority and 
nonminority children and between disadvantaged children and such children’s more 
advantaged peers.”  The signing statement questions this provision’s conformity with “the 
requirements of equal protection and due process under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment.”  There is no judicial precedent that would question the validity of this law 
under the Fifth – or any other – Amendment.  Only under a radical and unsupported 
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reconceptualization of the idea of equality could working to eliminate the achievement gap be 
considered constitutionally suspect.  This is not the Dellinger paradigm of a President 
wrestling to resolve a conflict between statutory and constitutional law.  The posture of the 
Bush Administration is that of an Administration that is wrestling to create conflicts in order 
to support the assertion of a power to dispense with the execution of the laws.    
   
Because President Bush has found constitutional problems with statutes so readily and 
because he takes such a radically expansive view of his own power, President Bush’s position 
amounts to a claim that he is impervious to the laws that Congress enacts.  This amounts to 
the view articulated in President Richard Nixon’s notorious dictum, “If the President does it, 
that means it is not illegal.”  Precisely to guard against such claims, Congress has enacted a 
law that requires the Attorney General to "submit to the Congress a report of any instance in 
which the Attorney General or any officer of the Department of Justice . . . establishes or 
implements a formal or informal policy to refrain . . . from enforcing, applying, or 
administering any provision of any Federal statute . . . whose enforcement, application, or 
administration is within the responsibility of the Attorney General or such officer on the 
grounds that such provision is unconstitutional." Subsection (e) of that statute extends this 
reporting obligation to the head of each executive agency or military department that 
implements such a policy of "constitutional noncompliance." Such a report must be made 
within 30 days after the policy is implemented, and must "include a complete and detailed 
statement of the relevant issues and background (including a complete and detailed statement 
of the reasons for the policy or determination)."  
 
But President Bush apparently regards this reporting requirement, like so many others, to 
raise serious constitutional concerns.  As such, he may be refusing to comply with it.  If so, 
this represents a serious assault on the constitutional system of checks and balances.  That 
system is premised on the idea that the President is not above the law but is, like all other 
citizens, bound to obey the law.  The primary check that Congress has on the President is its 
power to legislate rules that govern everyone, including the President himself.  This is the 
preeminent power in our constitutional system and explains why James Madison famously 
regarded Congress to be the most dangerous branch under our Constitution.  If the President 
may dispense with application of laws by concocting a constitutional objection, we will 
quickly cease to live under the rule of law. 
 
